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The Ethics of Human Intervention on Behalf of 
‘Others’
I regularly pass several homeless persons surviving on the streets even in win-
ter. One sits on a folded scrap of a blanket leaning against a wall looking 
thin, pale and resigned, doing some calligraphy of messages on card for those 
who want them. Almost everyone walks quickly past, some manoeuvring to 
the opposite side of the wide pavement, others almost treading on some of 
their sparse belongings. Hardly anyone makes eye contact. The harsh reality 
of living on the street is some days without enough food and basic provisions. 
Christmas produces a spike of concern and generosity that vanishes immedi-
ately afterwards. Advice issued by the local authorities and charities cautions 
against giving money, on the basis of characterising all street people as sub-
stance abusers. Since the rise of Thatcherist meritocracy and neoliberalism, 
homelessness, living and dying on the streets has become rife in the UK. This 
policy failure suggests a moral obligation on ‘witnesses’ to help, to prevent 
or reduce suffering, but what interventions on what basis? A recent newspa-
per article by a once homeless person (Lavelle, 2019) offers sobering simple 
guidance to those who wish to help, and that includes talking and engaging 
with those suffering. Sympathy and engagement seem hard enough with other 
humans, but they at least have the potential to directly express their concerns 
and communicate, while there are many who remain effectively silent – such 
as children, future generations and non-humans.
In environmental ethics strong themes have been to debate human obliga-
tions toward the last of these groups and Nature more generally. Arguments 
are put forward for moral status of sentient beings as well as other non-human 
organisms and entities (such as rivers or lakes) in decision-making and seeking 
to enable flourishing and enforce rights. This raises the problem of how inter-
vention should be undertaken when rights or flourishing-potential of different 
morally considerable subjects conflict. The major alternative, consequentialist 
reasoning, has its own problems such as reduction of values to utilitarian pain 
and pleasure principles. More generally, in this materialist managerial age, 
there are concerns over objectification of the other and excessive technocratic 
‘solutions’ that pay little attention to the constituent values of ‘others’ and their 
autonomy.
This issue of Environmental Values concerns a range of arguments 
about what is appropriate intervention on the behalf of non-human ‘others’. 
According to the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Services (IPBES, 2019) the top three drivers for biodiversity 
loss are: (i) changes in land and sea use; (ii) direct exploitation of organisms; 
and (iii) accelerated climate change. These human-induced factors involve a 
complex web of interests, interactions, dependencies and different levels of 
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overt or obscure powers. Criticism of ‘business as usual’ and ‘sloppy’ or ma-
nipulative democracy call for systemic political change (e.g. Machin, 2019). 
Any progress along such ‘new’ trajectories may help alleviate millennials’ 
deep-seated angst about environmental thresholds being surpassed, and their 
frustration about not seeing policies and actions to secure their future from 
world leaders and decision-makers. However, it is open to debate how non-an-
thropocentric perspectives should be taken into account, or what interventions 
on behalf of non-human others are justified and on what basis.
The core principle of non-anthropocentric ethics is to extend moral standing 
to non-humans such as animals, plants and landscapes. American Pragmatists 
Ben Minteer and Bryan Norton have argued that non-anthropocentric view-
points, as expressed by J. Baird Callicott, Eric Katz, Holmes Rolston III and 
Laura Westra, are anti-democratic. Mark Alan Michael unpacks and responds 
to this pragmatist position. He identifies three specific claims that are made 
about non-anthropocentrists by their pragmatist critics: (1) that they know the 
political truth; (2) that anyone disagreeing with their basic principle should 
be excluded from policy discussions; and (3) that their basic principle is self-
evident. Quoting key passages from the work of Norton and Minteer, Michael 
deconstructs each of these characterisations of non-anthropocentrists.
Claim (1) is clarified by Michael’s differentiation between political truths, 
which, drawing on David Copp’s ‘political truth principle’, means convincing 
responses to the question of ‘What society ought to do?’, and political author-
ity, which involves matters of fairness and equality of the political system. 
Michael argues that to think that political truth exists and that non-anthropo-
centrists may put a claim on such truth does not equate with making claims of 
where political authority should lie. Claim (2) is clarified by Michael’s distinc-
tion between political context (PC) and epistemic context (EC) when making 
policy. Here, decision-making rules and any constraints on deliberation are 
subject to answering how political authority is to be justified (Michael, 2020: 
17–18). Decisions may fail to reflect political truth,1 but this is the price of the 
democratic process with fair and equal treatment of voters. That said, striving 
for truth and debate to elicit political truth are seen as prime concerns that con-
stitute the ‘epistemic context’. Policies and positions that are deemed to fail 
under scrutiny can and should be rejected, and this is consistent with demo-
cratic process. Claim (3) considers the question of whether the basic moral 
anthropocentric principle is self-evidently true. Michael explains that the issue 
here is not about whether the claim to moral superiority is true but whether it 
is self-evident. He then argues that if a basic principle being self-evident can 
be debated and supported by reasoned argument, then the charge of being anti-
democratic is misplaced.
1. The term ‘political truth’ is not further unpacked in the article beyond introducing David 
Copp’s ‘political truth principle’; key here is that a moral realist perspective claims that 
truths, about what society ought to do, exist.
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Continuing the theme of the moral considerablilty of the non-human, Kyle 
Johannsen argues for large-scale human interventions in nature on the basis 
that negative duties (e.g. preventing harm) trump positive duties (doing good). 
In particular, well intentioned action to reduce wild animal suffering should 
not be prevented due to uncertainty or fallibility. Evolutionary and ecological 
knowledge informs Johannsen’s explanation and the rationale for fallibility-
constrained interventions. The theory of r-Strategy and K-Strategy species 
provides an example (without necessarily endorsing the theory). The r-strategy 
species are those that produce a lot of young, most of which perish in rela-
tively harsh or predatory circumstances, whereas K-strategy species produce 
few offspring, and tend to closely protect and rear them. Based on the obser-
vation that most wild animals tend to be r-Strategists whose young largely 
live short painful lives, a three-step argument is constructed which leads to 
the conclusion that: ‘Most sentient individuals born into the world do not live 
flourishing lives, and their lives may not be worth living’ (Johannsen, 2020: 
4). Some suggested interventions to reduce suffering relate to gene editing to 
modify r-Strategists to become more like K-Strategists. This is similar to the 
argument by Rohwer (2018) for cognitively enhancing animals, such as native 
Australian marsupials, that are currently deemed to be ill-equipped to identify 
introduced predatory species (e.g. feral cats and red foxes) which is then given 
as the primary reason for their massive decline, and some extinction, over the 
past 200 years. Johannsen (2020: 34) then criticises two specific positions: 
‘first, a cautious attitude toward intervention doesn’t take wild animal suffer-
ing seriously enough’ and ‘second, even a cautious attitude toward intervention 
is reckless’.
The ethical basis for intervention is also addressed by Andrew McCumber 
and Zachary King’s article, which provides a very topical discourse analy-
sis of ecologically informed policy and social media responses relating to 
the ‘Thomas Fire’ event in California in 2017. Its relevance and context go 
well beyond wildfires, highlighting emerging ‘radical transformations’ of so-
cial–ecological connections due to emergencies caused by human action that 
threatens the flourishing and survival of wild animals. The authors make a 
compelling case for easing tensions between polarised domains: between ‘in-
terventionist’ and ‘non-interventionist’ stances to the assisting of wild animals 
during disasters; and between micro-level human concern for and interaction 
with wildlife and macro-ecological perspectives reflected in formal wildlife 
policies and advice.
McCumber and King highlight that non-intervention advice on helping wild 
animals in urban contexts is usually regarded as rational (to keep wild animals 
wild and not make them dependent on humans), but the same could be said for 
temporary interventions by humans when helping wild animals access water 
and migrate to new habitats after a devastating fire. Increasing encroachment 
and deterioration caused by humans directly (e.g. new development and land 
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use change) and indirectly (e.g. pollution and climate change) produce envi-
ronmental injustices and disasters in-waiting. Official policies and advice may 
thus have to adjust to help prevent further loss and damage and secure support 
to maintain habitats and populations of wildlife species. This also connects the 
micro-level, such as individual/neighbourhood/local scale action, with macro-
scale ecological management. In McCumber and King’s own words, we need 
‘a more critical and holistic approach to social responsibility and environmen-
tal issues’ where ‘our affective, personal relations to the nonhuman world […] 
may stimulate environmental concern in the first place’ (p. 49). The results 
from the in-depth discourse analysis, along with their (re-)conceptualisation 
of human assistance to (wild) animals in the context of the Anthropocene, pro-
vides some interesting parallels with how human actions change the ability of 
wildlife to cope (as referred to above in relation to Johannsen’s article) and 
questions the assumption that nature can always take care of itself.
Christian Hunold’s article also focuses on human–wildlife relations in 
an urban environment and particular wild species that adopt urban areas as 
their habitat. This is a phenomenon that is probably increasing due to urban 
greening measures and deterioration of ‘rural’ wildlife habitats. Philadelphia 
is used for a case study which analyses fifteen urban greening professionals’ 
perceptions and practices in response to animal occurrences in the urban en-
vironment. Hunold identified three distinct frames for how these practitioners 
relate to urban wildlife, namely in terms of animal control, public health and 
biodiversity. A key question, and food for thought for city planning, is ‘whether 
cities teeming with wildlife are also becoming cities for wildlife, not just ma-
terially but also ontologically, in the sense that the needs of wild animals are 
actively accommodated in policy and design’ (p. 69). Another poignant ques-
tion is whether we need to let go of a focus on ‘private’ and ‘human’ spaces 
that optimise environments for human purposes and instead better account for 
ecological needs and thus adopt ecological design principles and policies that 
factor both human and wildlife needs into urban planning. Hunold reports that 
‘biodiversity-oriented framing of urban planning has had little influence on 
municipal policy’ (p. 83). The considerations in this article go far beyond the 
specifics of Philadelphia with implications for all urban ‘development’.
Hunold’s line of argument steers towards a holistic approach that argues 
for peaceful human–wildlife coexistence, where the urban/nature dualism is 
no longer seen as creating exclusive realms that emphasise human–wildlife 
conflict, but where instead connection with nature is seen as advantageous for 
human health and well-being (even though the conflation of human and nature 
realities is contentious, see e.g. Pollini, 2013). Some enforcement of bounda-
ries between human and wildlife would still be necessary (such as keeping 
wildlife species that are regarded as ‘pests’ out of buildings), but overall hav-
ing more wildlife in cities is argued to be beneficial for public health as well 
as biodiversity. That said, the questions of what ‘wild animals’ and ‘wildlife’ 
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this targets or includes and where lines would be drawn in urban planning and 
greenspace design are not explicitly discussed beyond the case study.
These ideas link to themes recently discussed by others in Environmental 
Values. While some urban greening aims to attract wild animals, urban areas 
have also become a test-bed for technology-infused complex human–nature 
‘hybrid’ situations linked to technologising nature and naturalising technology 
as part of urban design and planning – as, for example, discussed by Hoły-
Łuczaj and Blok (2019). This raises issues around anthropomorphising nature 
and in so doing affecting its autonomy. It also highlights some of the tensions 
in rewilding efforts, even when aimed at rural rather than urban areas (see, for 
example, the discussion of the case of the Cambrian Wildwood in Wales by 
Wynne-Jones et al., 2018). Drenthen (2005: 333) helpfully points to the human 
dilemma of valuing wildlife and wilderness precisely because it is ‘something 
radically other … which both has to and cannot be properly appropriated’, 
and this theme is also dealt with by Gammon (2018) and other articles in the 
Environmental Values 27(4) special issue on ‘Rewilding in Cultural Layered 
Landscapes’.
The final article in this issue takes the reader back to scrutinising what we 
actually mean by wilderness and how the concept is defined and applied at a 
time when human interference has seemingly spread across the globe. Joshua 
Duclos focuses on four objections – empirical, cultural/racial, philosophical 
and environmental – because he believes the idea of ‘wilderness’ needs un-
complicating, sifting out ‘misguided, irrelevant, and inaccurate’ objections 
(p. 105). Debating the usefulness and meaning of ‘wilderness’ is in his view 
worthwhile.
In response to the empirical objection Duclos argues that ‘wilderness’ can 
be regarded as a relative rather than an absolute concept, where ‘purity’ is the 
relative absence of human activity and influence rather than an area totally de-
void of any cultural imprint or human impact. He exemplifies this with a string 
of comparisons, where the degree of wilderness is shown to be greater than (>) 
another: Alaskan National Wildlife Refuge > Walden Pond > Boston Common 
> Logan Airport. The cultural, ethnic and racial objections relate to ‘Western 
ethnocentrism, racial insensitivity, and cultural myopia’ (p. 94) which Duclos 
acknowledges do exist, e.g. in relation to some cultural bias in motivations 
to preserve or restore species, habitats or wilderness; and furthermore the ex-
istence of cultural and scientific arrogance. In response to these objections, 
Duclos sees the crux of the matter as distinguishing between the evaluative 
and the factual and focusing on scrutiny and transparency to avoid scientific- 
or otherwise-derived myths or inaccuracies. With regard to the philosophical 
objection (which concerns an untenable human–nature dualism), Duclos once 
again acknowledges its partial truth, but in response highlights the existence 
of critical differences between humans (and human culture) and (wild) nature. 
Finally, tackling the environmental objection which centres around the need 
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for environmental action rather than philosophical debate, Duclos argues that 
philosophical debates have strengthened the rationale for and motivated envi-
ronment action even though ‘philosophy is not – and should not be – activism’ 
(p. 104).
The ethics of human intervention on behalf of others shows a plurality of 
arguments and wide range of influential thinkers and calls for policy change 
and human action. I found the articles in this issue an interesting continuation 
and extension of other recent discussions in this journal, and especially is-
sues 27(2), 27(4) and 28(3), as partly reflected in the comments and references 
mentioned above. In an editorial for Environmental Values Marion Hourdequin 
writes about foregrounding change and opening up ‘new ways of conceiv-
ing and acting in relation to nature’ (2018: 116), which could help bridge the 
policy–action/implementation gap. The papers by McCumber and King (2020) 
and Hunold (2020) also contribute to that. Kaaronen (2018: 179) writes about 
‘drawing an ontological bridge between humans and nature’ and ‘providing a 
coherent philosophical basis … for policy making’, and the papers by Michael 
(2020), Johannsen (2020) and Duclos (2020) raise important points for debate. 
In an age in which human systems create unforeseen impacts that have become 
the major concern for humans and non-humans alike, the role of intervention 
on behalf of others requires serious reflection and an ethical foundation.
CLAUDIA CARTER
Birmingham City University
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